T he observation that people often tend to stick to an initial decision, even when new evidence proves this decision to be incorrect, has been an important topic of interest in research on human decision making. 1 To explain this phenomenon of tunnel vision or ''freezing'' on initial judgments, psychological researchers have advanced the need for (cognitive) closure theory and concept (NFC), 2 which refers to ''the desire for an answer on a given topic, any answer, . . . compared to confusion and ambiguity.'' 3 This desire promotes quick judgments and prevents people from reconsidering earlier decisions. The NFC can be elicited by situational factors (e.g., time pressure), but individuals also differ in their dispositional levels of NFC, characterized by a preference for order and predictability, a need for decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness, each of which is tapped by the validated NFC scale. 3, 4 Indeed, although human decision making is inherently driven by existing knowledge structures and expectations (i.e., schemata), numerous studies have shown that high levels of dispositional and situationally induced NFC substantially increase freezing behavior in a similar way. 2, 3 The NFC effect is well established in the psychological literature on lay judgment and decision making and has been demonstrated to affect various expressions of freezing, such as resistance to persuasion and numerical anchoring. 2 However, NFC effects have rarely been studied in specialized areas of decision making where the consequences of freezing behavior are particularly relevant and potentially even dangerous.
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Researchers in medical decision making and education have become increasingly interested in how decision-making research in psychology can contribute to a better understanding and optimization of medical decision-making practice. [5] [6] [7] [8] Given the established impact of ''dispositional factors'' such as NFC on decision making and the potentially severe consequences of freezing behavior in medical practice, some scholars 7 have even made the interesting suggestion to consider screening prospective medical students for dispositional tendencies such as NFC.
However, the NFC concept and theory were developed as a framework for lay epistemics and decision making, 2 and previous research has therefore exclusively focused on lay decisions in general contexts. As such, the impact of dispositional NFC in specialized domains such as medical decision making and the role of experience/expertise in the effect are still unknown. The present study therefore examines whether dispositional NFC also elicits freezing behavior in medical decision making and whether its effects may be affected by medical training/experience.
METHOD Participants
Two distinct groups of medical students from a large Flemish University were recruited after class and through e-mail invitations to participate on a voluntary basis. The ''less experienced'' group consisted of 58 students in their fifth or sixth year of medical school, who at that moment had only received general (i.e., ''basic/generic'') medical education and not yet had clinical experience (mean age = 25 years, 63.8% women). The ''more experienced'' group consisted of 68 medical doctor trainees in general/family medicine (seventh or eighth year of medical school, further specialization; mean age = 27 years, 70.6% women), who had substantially higher experience in medical decision making given their considerable and specific training in family medicine diagnostics and intensive internships.
Procedure and Measures
Participants completed 2 computerized diagnostic cases, in which they received stepwise information about a patient (6 or 8 pieces/consultations for case A or B, respectively, where each item consisted of only a few sentences). In each step, participants were asked for a (single) potential diagnosis and to rate their confidence (on Likert-type scales from 1 = not certain at all to 10 = absolutely certain). Information was organized so that the most likely initial diagnosis was gradually disconfirmed with increasing information (i.e., new symptoms, laboratory results). Case A was designed to initially look like a case of pyelonephritis but turned out to be a gastrointestinal infection. For case B, the initial information suggested asthma but proved to be gastroesophageal reflux based on the additional information. Case B was developed to be assumedly more difficult to solve than case A (e.g., more atypical presentation of the problem, initial ambiguity of the disconfirming evidence), to allow testing for potential difficulty effects.
To measure decisional freezing in the diagnostic process, for each participant, we calculated how many steps it took to abandon his or her initial, incorrect diagnosis and consider an alternative (regardless of its correctness).
Dispositional NFC was measured by the revised NFC scale, 4 which contains 41 items to be answered on 6-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree) (present sample: mean [SD], 3.68 [0.30]; a = .72). Sample item: ''I dislike questions that could be answered in many different ways.''
The research was conducted in accordance with the institution's independent ethics committee guidelines, and participants' informed consent was obtained. The funding source had no role in the study. Data were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA) in SPSS 19 (SPSS, Inc., an IBM Company, Chicago, IL).
RESULTS
Preliminary ANOVA revealed no difference in NFC levels between the less experienced (mean [SD], 3.66 [0.32]) and the more experienced group (3.70 [0.29]); F(1, 125) = .73, P = 0.39. Also, as expected, case B showed to be more difficult than case A, but no significant differences between groups were found in the percentage of participants that eventually reached the correct diagnosis (case A, 89.6% v. 89.7%; case B, 77.6% v. 72.1%); x 2 = .00 and .51, respectively.
For the main analysis, repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with the freezing measure for the 2 cases as a within-subject variable, group as the between-subject factor, and NFC score as a covariate. No within-subject main or interaction effects of case were found; all F(1, 117) \ .37, all P . 0.55, signaling that case difficulty did not significantly affect freezing or the effects of the other variables on freezing. Tests of between-subject effects revealed that the more experienced group showed significantly higher levels of freezing compared with the less experienced group (case A 1 case B, mean [SD]: 7.68 [2.05] v. 7.09 [1.47]); F(1, 116) = 6.88, P = 0.01. NFC had no main effects, but a substantial interaction effect emerged between group and NFC level; F(1, 116) = 6.20, P = 0.01. In the less experienced group, NFC had a strong, positive effect on decisional freezing (b = .36, P\0.01; b = .19, P = 0.17; and b = .31, P = 0.02 for the overall effect, case A, and case B, respectively). In contrast, NFC did not show substantial associations with freezing behavior in the ''more experienced'' group (b = -.14, -.11, and -.10, respectively; all P . 0.25).
No main or interaction effects of group and NFC were found on confidence in the initial diagnosis ( Finally, we tested for each case whether freezing on the initial diagnosis was related to whether participants eventually reached a correct diagnosis. Overall, participants who failed to find the correct diagnosis showed higher freezing; case A: F(1, 118) = 13.90, case B: F(1, 122) = 18.23, both P \ 0.001. Most interestingly, however, for both cases, an interaction effect with group was found; F(1, 118) = 3.88, P = 0.05, and F(1, 122) = 16.34, P \ 0.001. Contrast analyses showed that the participants from the more experienced group who failed to reach a correct diagnosis maintained their initial diagnosis significantly longer than participants in the 3 other groups (see Table 1 ). Indeed, significant differences were found comparing the unsuccessful more experienced group with the unsuccessful less experienced group, the successful more experienced group, and the successful less experienced group. The unsuccessful less experienced group, the successful more experienced group, and the successful less experienced group did not differ from each other in either of the cases, all P . 0.23.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to investigate freezing behavior in medical diagnostics as a function of dispositional NFC and clinical training/experience. The results showed that, in line with previous studies on lay decision making, 2-4 NFC was indeed associated with higher decisional freezing but only in medical students without clinical experience; the association was not found in medical trainees with clinical experience. It is noteworthy that the more experienced group showed more freezing than the less experienced group, but this difference was entirely due to those more experienced participants who diagnosed incorrectly. On the basis of this study, no claims can be made about the direction of effect between freezing and misdiagnosis. Yet, in line with previous research on expert v. novice decision making, 8 we propose that because of their relative lack of preexisting structured knowledge, ''novice'' decision makers rely more on piecemeal information processing and may therefore easily switch to a new diagnosis, even if earlier information does not fit this diagnosis. More experienced diagnosticians, however, use more structured information processing by integrating new information in existing knowledge 8, 9 and hence consider the accumulated information. If they cannot find an overall fitting diagnosis, this strategy makes them more prone to maintaining their initial diagnosis.
In sum, the present findings suggest that for less experienced medical students, the degree of freezing indeed depends on their level of NFC (i.e., epistemic motivation), whereas for more experienced medical students, maintaining an initial, incorrect diagnosis may rather depend on epistemic ability. Yet, causality in the latter process cannot be determined in the present design and should be determined in future research. Also, given that previous research 5 suggested that decision biases may decrease again in highly experienced physicians, future studies may use various, more differentiated groups and seek to further qualify the experience-freezing relationships in more detail. Values represent mean (standard deviation) of the number of information items received before switching to a new diagnosis.
